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COASTAL STATE OBLIGATIONS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF REFUGEES AT SEA UNDER THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS1 
Stefan Kirchner,2 Katarzyna Geler-Noch3 and Vanessa Frese4 
ABSTRACT 
As early as 2004, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
created “Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea,” 
which followed IMO Assembly resolution A. 920(22) on the review of 
safety measures and procedures for the treatment of persons rescued at 
sea. These Guidelines are supplemented by an appendix entitled “Some 
comments on relevant international law” (“Comments”). It comes as no 
surprise that the IMO’s work in this area refers to other maritime 
documents such as the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), and the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR). 
Reference in the Comments to the 1951 Refugee Convention is made only 
briefly. In this context, the differing obligations of the flag state, the 
coastal state, and the ship’s master can lead to situations in which the 
protection awarded to refugees is less than complete, as happened in the 
2001 case of the MV Tampa. The IMO Guidelines seek to prevent such a 
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scenario by requiring flag and coastal states to “have effective 
arrangements in place for timely assistance to shipmasters in relieving 
them of persons recovered by ships at sea.” However, these rules are 
often unenforceable by individual claimants - unlike the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This research project examines 
the question of whether such a positive obligation on the part of the 
coastal state also exists under the ECHR. It is the overall aim of this 
research project to contribute to a better understanding of the maritime 
application of the ECHR and of human rights obligations of state actors 
in the maritime sector. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Human rights abuses at sea are an often overlooked problem. 
Essentially, these abuses are often “out of sight, out of mind,” and 
maritime-related human rights issues therefore receive little attention. 
This is striking, when taking into account the importance of the sea to the 
economy, as well as the longstanding naval traditions of many European 
states. This is particularly true with regard to the human rights of 
seafarers5 and as applied to the increasing influx of refugees that try to 
reach Europe by sea, which has become impossible to overlook in recent 
years. Lately, the sea has become the primary way for refugees and 
illegal immigrants to enter the European Union.6 Time and again, 
attempts to cross the seas have ended in disaster. Leaving the coast of 
Northern Africa, refugees and illegal migrants primarily attempt to reach 
either the European mainland, (e.g. Spain) or towards islands such as 
Malta, the Canary Islands, or Lampedusa, a small Italian island close to 
Northern Africa which has become famous for the large number of 
refugees who have taken refuge there and for the many refugees who 
have died off its shores.7  The sea is often treacherous and the boats that 
refugees use for the crossing are often far from seaworthy – neither built 
nor equipped to operate on the sea, far from shore. Nonetheless, nature 
and weather are not the only dangers for refugees. It is not unheard of for 
                                                     
 5. For more on the human rights of seafarers (prior to the Maritime Labor 
Convention of 2006), see ALASTAIR D. COUPER, VOYAGES OF ABUSE: SEAFARERS, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 139 (1999). 
 6. Silja Klepp, A Contested Asylum System: The European Union Between Refugee 
Protection and Border Control in the Mediterranean Sea, 12 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 1, 2 
(2010). 
 7. On the Lampedusa tragedy of 2013, see Livia Borghese et al., Italy Mourns More 
than 100 Migrants Killed in Lampedusa Shipwreck, CNN (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/04/world/europe/italy-migrant-boat-sinks/. 
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smugglers to abandon refugees at sea, on boats that purposely lack the 
necessary amount of fuel to return to shore.8 In this way, the smugglers 
avoid being arrested for human smuggling by the coastal state 
authorities. Oftentimes, the refugees pay for this ploy with their lives.9 
While many efforts have been made by the coast guards in southern 
Europe to save these refugees, thousands have lost their lives in the last 
few years.10 
II. REFUGEES AT SEA 
This problem is by no means limited to Europe. For thousands of 
years people have sought a better future beyond the sea. However, 
traveling by sea is inherently dangerous. While the contemporary world 
takes the transport of goods by sea for granted, and despite the fact that 
the globalized economy would not be possible without the work of 
seafarers, the public perception of maritime travel is overly influenced by 
romanticized ideas of the sea. When disaster strikes there are often calls 
for action, but the understanding held by policy makers is often 
insufficient to address the underlying problems. For example, the Costa 
Concordia11 disaster elicited many reactions among lawmakers, but it 
was by no means the worst disaster of its kind that had occurred within 
the course of just a few weeks.12 Generally, political perceptions of 
maritime issues are limited, and politicians therefore lack the practical 
expertise that is required to properly regulate maritime issues. This is a 
problem that has been taken into account by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). In some instances, however, state level public 
policy can effectively let those they seek to regulate and protect fall 
through the cracks of an incomplete legal system that by its very nature 
will always remain a work in progress. This is particularly the case when 
                                                     
 8. RAY WALSER ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE HUMAN TRAGEDY OF ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION: GREATER EFFORTS NEEDED TO COMBAT SMUGGLING AND VIOLENCE (2011), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/the-human-tragedy-of-
illegal-immigration-greater-efforts-needed-to-combat-smuggling-and-violence. 
 9. Id. 
 10. EUR. PARL. ASSEMBLY, The “Left-to-Die Boat”: Actions and Reactions, 21st 
Sess., Doc. No. AA14CR21ADD1 (2014), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link= 
/Documents/Records/2014/E/1406241000ADDE.htm. 
 11. See Eur. Union Civil Prot. Team, Observation Mission, Giglio Island, 26-29 Jan 
2012, Costa Concordia, available at https://www.msb.se/Upload 
/Insats_och_beredskap/Brand_raddning/RITS/Concordia_Mission_final_report.pdf. 
 12. List of Shipwrecks in 2012, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/List_of_shipwrecks_in_2012 (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
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it comes to saving lives at sea. While maritime travel and work at sea are, 
and always have been, inherently dangerous, the development and 
enforcement of new norms does not allow states to remain idle.  
III. NON-REFOULEMENT: THE DANGER OF BEING JUS COGENS  
The principle of non-refoulement, which at first glance seems to be a 
state obligation under Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees,13 is interpreted by the Court as a comprehensive, individual 
right, stemming from Article 3 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights14 (ECHR) in conjunction with Article 13. This individual right 
leads to states’ duties to both provide the necessary protection on the 
high seas to persons in distress and to also provide refugees the 
opportunity to apply for asylum or international protection under the 
Geneva Convention.15 Article 4(1) of the Dublin Convention requires 
that refugees stay in the country in which they first seek refuge.16 Against 
this background, some states have no interest in having refugees come 
under their jurisdiction in the first place because of the principle of non-
refoulement, the obligation to not send refugees back to areas17 where 
there is a real risk that they will be persecuted.18 This principle is 
included in Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention,19 which has 
been ratified by 145 states, including almost all European states.20 It is 
even argued that the principle of non-refoulement has achieved the status 
of jus cogens;21 that is, a norm of international law from which no 
                                                     
 13. U.N., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, 28 July 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention], available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN 
/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx. 
 14. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950. 
 15. Albrecht Weber, Menschenrechtlicher Schutz von Bootsflüchtlingen. Bedeutung 
des Straßburger Hirsi-Jamaa-Urteils für den Flüchtlingsschutz, ZAR 8/2012, at 265, 269, 
available at http://www.zar.nomos.de/fileadmin/zar/doc/Aufsatz_ZAR_12_08.pdf. 
 16. Council Regulation 343/2003, 2003 O.J. 50/1–5/10 (EC). 
 17. See Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement, 13(4) INT’L J.  
REFUGEE L., 533, 533 (2001), available at 
http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/content/13/4/533.abstract.  
 18. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
301(2005). 
 19. Refugee Convention, supra note 13, at art. 33(1). 
 20.  U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, State Parties to the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (July 25, 1951), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html. 
 21. Allain, supra note 17, at 533. 
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deviation is permitted.22 The widespread acceptance of the principle of 
non-refoulement has caused some states to devise ways to avoid 
accepting refugees into their jurisdiction altogether.23 Refugees are often 
not welcome and in many countries face restrictions with regard to where 
they can reside,24 and despite having the willingness to work and the 
requisite skills (after all, wanting to work in a developed country in order 
to provide for a family back home is one of the key incentives for many 
refugees to risk their lives at sea), many countries deny work permits to 
refugees. Instead of being perceived as providing a benefit, refugees are 
often seen as an unwanted fiscal burden to the public.25  
Because of the principle of non-refoulment, it is no longer 
permissible for states to send refugees back to countries in which they 
are at risk. This incentivizes states to designate unsafe countries as being 
sufficiently safe to return to; however, this designation does not release 
states from accepting refugees from countries that are actually too 
dangerous to return to. It is well-established that the principle of non-
refoulement applies where substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk 
of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR in the 
receiving country.26 Article 3 prohibits torture and inhumane and 
degrading treatment. Thus, it provides an effective means of protection 
against the deportation of refugees to states where there is risk that the 
                                                     
 22. See Jus Cogens, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex 
/jus_cogens (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
 23. Australia exempted certain territories from its migration zone with the Migration 
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 and the Migration Amendment 
(Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001. As a result 
Australia was not obliged to grant a person a visa for their stay in Australia even if they 
were a recognized UNHCR refugee. 
 24. See Tony Paterson, Swiss Introduce Apartheid-like Restrictions: Local Authorities 
Ban Asylum Seekers from Public Places, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 7, 2013) 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/swiss-introduce-apartheidlike-
restrictions-local-authorities-ban-asylum-seekers-from-public-places-8750765.html. 
 25. See Streit um Kosten der Asylbewerber-Unterkunft,, MERKUR-ONLINE.DE (Nov. 24, 
2009), http://www.merkur-online.de/aktuelles/politik/streit-kosten-asylbewerber-
unterbringung-meta-538808.html (Ger.); Flüchtlingswesen kostet Steuerzahler 134 Millionen, 
in: KRONENZEITUNG, July 30, 2013, available at 
http://www.krone.at/Oesterreich/Fluechtlingswesen_kostet_Steuerzahler_134_Millionen-
Beachtliche_Summe-Story-370589 (Austria). 
 26. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 88 (1989); Chahal v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74,  (Nov. 15, 1996), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58004#{“itemid”:[“001-
58004”]}. 
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individual will be subjected to torture, or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  
Exposing an applicant to degrading detention and living conditions 
also invokes the ban on refoulement. When assessing conditions of 
detention, the European Court of Human Rights takes into account their 
cumulative effects, the applicant’s specific allegations and the duration 
of detention.27 In the case of Article 3 of the ECHR, the Court does not 
focus on whether the risk is one of torture or ill treatment, as both are 
prohibited under the Convention to the same extent. Article 3 also 
prohibits indirect removal through an intermediary country, of an alien, 
to a country where he or she runs such a risk of torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment.28 Even removal to a contracting party to the 
Convention does not discharge the sending state from the responsibility 
of ensuring deportation will not result in violation of the refugee’s 
fundamental rights under the Convention. The sending state cannot 
justify its actions on the Dublin Regulation29 by simply stating that a 
Member State which is responsible for processing any asylum 
application is the state through which the asylum-seeker entered the 
territory of the European Union. Therefore, some governments have 
sought ways in which to limit their obligations proactively. The 
prohibition on refoulment provides an incentive for states to prevent 
refugees from initially coming within their jurisdiction. In principle, 
there are two ways in which states attempt to do so. The first way is to 
declare that, for immigration purposes, some regions of the national 
territory do not fall under the jurisdiction of that nation’s immigration 
authorities. In other words, arriving in specific areas is not considered 
equivalent to actually immigrating, and a request for asylum made in 
such an area is considered invalid. While some countries do this with 
regard to specially designated areas in international airports,30 Australia 
has actually designated several islands off its coast to be outside of 
                                                     
 27. Garabayev v. Russia, App. No. 38411/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 75 (June 7, 2007), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80960#{“itemid”:[“001-
80960”]}. 
 28. TI v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43844/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ B6 (Mar. 7, 2000), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-5105#{“itemid”:[“001-
5105”]}. 
 29. Council Regulation, supra note 16. 
 30. See What Type of Visa do I Need to Transit Through an Airport in France?, 
FRANCE DIPLOMATIE, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coming-to-france/getting-a-
visa/article /what-type-of-visa-do-i-need-to (last visited Apr. 12, 2015) (explaining that in 
order to leave the international zone at the airport, a specific visa is necessary). 
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Australia for immigration purposes.31 In addition, Australia has been 
transferring refugees to detention centers outside the country, such as 
Papua-New Guinea.32 In contrast, the member states of the European 
Union cooperate in their efforts to secure the EU’s external borders, 
including the maritime borders, in the framework of FRONTEX.33 This 
initial effort to secure the border has become a de facto permanent rescue 
operation, which in 2013 was labeled by the Italian navy “Operation 
Mare Nostrum.”34 
IV. RESCUE AT SEA 
A. Duties 
The duty to rescue is deeply ingrained into the law of the sea. States 
are not the only actors who have a duty to rescue. Rather, there is a long-
standing expectation and duty of mutual help between ships during 
emergencies at sea. Therefore, the international law of the sea also 
imposes an obligation on the captain of the ship.35 Although diverting 
course to perform a rescue will usually result in a substantial financial 
loss for the owner and operator of the ship from additional wages paid, 
fuel costs incurred, and time lost, there is a general understanding in the 
maritime sector that costs arising as a consequence of fulfilling this age-
old obligation are simply part of doing business in this field. The 
problem of owners or operators asserting opposition to their master of 
the ship rescuing strangers has been seen as early as 1880 in Scaramanga 
                                                     
 31. See Melissa Phillips, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Excising Australia from the 
Migration Zone,  CONVERSATION (May 17, 2013), http://theconversation.com/out-of-
sight-out-of-mind-excising-australia-from-the-migration-zone-14387.  
 32. JANET PHILLIPS, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, THE ‘PACIFIC SOLUTION’ REVISITED: 
A STATISTICAL GUIDE TO THE ASYLUM SEEKER CASELOAD ON NAURU AND MANUS ISLAND, 
(2012), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Li
brary/pubs/BN/2012-2013/PacificSolution#_Toc334509636. 
 33. Missions and Tasks, FRONTEX, http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-
and-tasks/ (last visited Apr. 12. 2015) (stating that “Frontex promotes, coordinates and 
develops European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter 
applying the concept of Integrated Border Management.”). 
 34. Operation Mare Nostrum, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE: MARINA MILITARE, 
http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 
2014).  
 35. The terms “captain” and “master” are used interchangeably in this article since it 
is customary in many parts of the world to refer to a ship’s commanding officer as the 
“captain” even though he might not be a “captain” within the meaning of military law.  
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v. Stamp.36 There, the court held that “[t]o all who have to trust 
themselves to the sea, it is of the utmost importance that the promptings 
of humanity in this respect should not be checked or interfered with by 
prudential considerations as to injurious consequences, which may result 
to a ship or cargo from the rendering of the needed aid.”37 It follows from 
Article 98 (1) of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 
(UNCLOS)38 (as well as from Chapter V, Regulations 7, 10(a) and 33 of 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS))39 
that flag states must enact domestic legislation to force the master of a 
ship to provide assistance in such emergencies. States are, for example, 
required under Chapter V Regulation 7 of SOLAS to maintain search-
and-rescue equipment.40 While there are isolated instances in which 
companies that operate ships have instructed captains not to provide the 
help owed under the international law of the sea, it can be assumed that 
captains will usually not falter in their obligation, as they often feel as 
bound by notions of honor and maritime tradition as by law.  
In this context, it is important to note that different obligations exist 
on the part of the captain of the ship, the flag state, and the coastal state. 
These obligations both predate UNCLOS and are codified in UNCLOS,41 
but they are also specified in more detail in SOLAS42 and the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR).43 The 
master of the ship has an obligation to provide assistance to vessels in 
need.44 States are obliged under Article 98 (1) of UNCLOS to require 
through national law that masters of ships flying their flags to “(a) . . . 
render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) . 
. . proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if 
informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may 
reasonably be expected of him; [and] (c) after a collision, . . . render 
assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, where 
possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of 
                                                     
 36. Scaramanga v. Stamp, 5 C.P.D. 295 (1880). 
 37. Id. at 304. 
 38. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 39. International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter SOLAS]. 
 40. Id.  
 41. UNCLOS, supra note 38. 
 42. SOLAS, supra note 39. 
 43. International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, 1405 
U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter SAR]. 
 44. UNCLOS, supra note 38, at art. 98(1). 
2015] Coastal State Obligations 65 
 
registry and the nearest port at which it will call.”45 Article 98 (1) of 
UNCLOS therefore describes both the duties of the master of the ship 
and of the flag state.  
Article 98 (2) of UNCLOS, on the other hand, only describes the 
measures that coastal states “shall” take, such as the establishment of a 
search-and-rescue system.46 Article 98 (2) of UNCLOS can be 
interpreted to impose a duty on states to rescue, rather than merely a duty 
to provide assistance.47 The master of the ship is required to take action 
but does not owe a specific result. The coastal states, on the other hand, 
owe a specific result in the form of the establishment of a search-and-
rescue system. Unless the coastal state has also ratified a search-and-
rescue system, the obligations under Article 98 (2) of UNCLOS remain 
weak due to the use of the word “shall.” It is SAR which solidifies the 
coastal state’s legal obligations in this regard, just like it is SOLAS 
which solidifies the legal obligations regarding the safety of ships with 
regard to the flag state. 
B. Falling Through a Gap in the Law 
Discrepancies between these obligations can lead to gaps in the legal 
protection afforded to refugees. The provision of assistance owed under 
Article 98 (1) of UNCLOS might require bringing survivors of a 
shipwreck into the nearest port. The coastal state in question, however, 
would, if one were to look only at the wording of Article 98 (2) of 
UNCLOS, not necessarily be in violation of its obligations under this 
article if it were to deny the rescued persons entry into its territory. 
However, coastal states have a duty to provide assistance without regard 
to whether the person in need has entered the state’s coastal waters with 
or without permission.48 In other words, the duty to provide assistance to 
persons who suffer an emergency at sea also includes persons who plan 
to migrate to the coastal state illegally.  
SAR defines the scope of the duty to rescue as “an operation to 
retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical and other 
needs and deliver them to a place of safety.”49 Since there is no legal 
                                                     
 45. Id. 
 46. UNCLOS, supra note 38, at art. 98(2); see also SAR, supra note 43, at Annex ch. 
1.1. 
 47. See Jessica E. Tauman, Rescued at Sea, but Nowhere to Go: The Cloudy Legal 
Waters of the Tampa Crisis, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 461, 473 (2002).  
 48. SAR, supra note 43, at Annex ch. 2.1.10.  
 49. Id. at Annex ch. 1.3.2. 
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definition for the term “place of safety,”50 there is no specific 
requirement under international law which would require coastal states to 
allow rescued persons to disembark.51 After all, the nearest or most 
accessible “place of safety” might not even be within the territory of the 
coastal state. As an example, imagine a ship is off the neighboring and 
adjacent coasts of Sweden and Finland. Due to bad weather this ship 
suffers an emergency in Sweden’s territorial sea and rescue zone in the 
Baltic Sea, and Swedish vessels are able to come to the rescue and save 
those on board. In the meantime, the weather conditions have changed in 
a way that return to Swedish port is no longer safely possible and the 
closest port of refuge is located in Finland. In this hypothetical, the 
definition of the “place of safety” is therefore dependent on external 
circumstances. Alternatively, a ship’s draft might be such that a port, 
which would be a sufficient place of safety for a smaller vessel, is 
completely inaccessible. At most, international law should provide for 
very general descriptions of the characteristics expected from a place of 
safety. This necessary uncertainty, though, makes it harder to impose 
specific obligations upon states. However, this is not necessarily the 
purpose of UNCLOS or SAR. Their purpose is to make sure that human 
lives are saved as effectively as possible. Imposing further requirements 
upon coastal states in the context of the law of the sea could run counter 
to this purpose. While the law of the sea contains a human rights 
dimension,52 it is not intended to facilitate access to the coastal state’s 
land territory beyond the customary implied permission given to trading 
vessels to enter a port for trade. Immigration is no longer a similarly 
protected purpose for entry into a foreign port.  
Until a few years ago, this problem was only hypothetical as the 
moral force of the customs of seafaring was sufficient to handle such 
cases. Stricter immigration laws in wealthy countries, aimed at keeping 
out those who look for better economic opportunities in foreign nations, 
have changed the picture dramatically. 
                                                     
 50. Eur. Parl. Assembly, Resolution 1821, ¶¶ 5.2, 9.4. (June 21, 2011), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta11/ERES1821.htm. 
 51. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Background Note on the Protection of 
Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Rescued at Sea (Final version, including Annexes), ¶ 7 
(Mar. 18, 2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3e5f35e94.html. 
 52. See Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Arctic Sunrise Incident: A Multi-Faceted Law of 
the Sea Case with a Human Rights Dimension, 29 INT’L J.  MARINE & COASTAL L. 244 
(2014). 
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Of particular note is the experience of the crew of the ship MV 
Tampa, a roll-on/roll-off container cargo ship53 flying the flag of 
Norway.54 On August 26, 2001, the Tampa responded to a maritime 
emergency involving refugees from Afghanistan off the coast of 
Australia.55 About 450 refugees were rescued and taken on board the 
Tampa.56 Not being equipped to transport or care for such a large number 
of people, the ship headed for Australia in order to bring the refugees to 
land.57 Upon arrival to Australia, the captain of Tampa was arrested for 
human smuggling because the refugees did not possess valid 
immigration documents.58  
C. IMO’s Arrested for Human Smuggling 
The debate on the substantive nature of the right to rescue came to 
global attention in the Tampa affair between Norway and Australia.59 
Notes verbales between Norway and Australia clearly distinguished 
between the obligation to assist (which was what the Tampa did) and the 
obligation to rescue.60 Australia considered the rescue to be finished the 
moment the refugees had been on board the Tampa.61 During 
negotiations, differing interpretations of the term “rescue” prevented a 
speedy solution. The IMO Secretary General intervened and ordered a 
review of the relevant IMO instruments due to the potentially serious 
consequences of the divergent views, and it was concluded that new 
interpretation of the SOLAS and the SAR Conventions was needed.62 
The purpose of this review was to ensure that three basic humanitarian 
principles, which are part of the law of the sea, were met, namely: (i) 
persons in distress at sea will be provided assistance regardless of 
nationality, status, or the circumstances in which they are found, (ii) 
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vessels that recover persons in distress at sea will be allowed to deliver 
the rescued to a place of safety, and (iii) rescued persons, regardless of 
their nationality, status, or the circumstances in which they are found, 
including undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and 
stowaways, will be treated on board in the manner prescribed by the 
relevant IMO instruments and in accordance with international law and 
human rights law as well as longstanding humanitarian maritime 
traditions.63 
In reaction, the IMO adopted guidelines which aimed to ensure legal 
certainty for seafarers who fulfill their obligations with regard to those 
who are in need of assistance at sea and to prevent those who have been 
rescued, whether refugees or others, from falling into a kind of legal 
limbo.64 Refugees are most at risk because they cannot be sent back to 
their respective countries of origin. The IMO’s guidelines are directed to 
the states which have ratified either SOLAS or SAR.65 While not binding 
as such, the IMO’s guidelines direct states in the application of SOLAS 
and SAR, and in general, IMO guidelines enjoy a high rate of 
compliance, at least among the more developed states. But even this 
distinction developing and developed nations has been eroding, for the 
better. While there are still some states which offer flags of convenience, 
enabling ship owners to operate ships at very low environmental and 
employment standards, the situation has been improved significantly in 
recent years as the shipping industry has undergone a process of 
professionalization and globalization. In particular, the latter is of 
importance for understanding the way in which the shipping industry 
works.66 At the same time, the IMO benefits from the fact that many who 
are involved in its work, including those involved in the legislative67 
process, have had practical experience in the field. This helps to ensure a 
relatively high rate of compliance with IMO guidelines.68  
Changes to the IMO regime were finally contained in Resolution 
A.920(22) that entered into force on July 1, 2006.69 This resolution 
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primarily contains clarifications on how states and seafarers will 
cooperate to assist any persons rescued at sea regardless of status.70  
The Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea adopted 
by the IMO specify that the obligation of the master of a ship to render 
assistance should be complemented by the corresponding obligation of 
states to rescue.71 After the Tampa, however, the shipmaster was granted 
a certain degree of discretion when assessing the safety of life at sea: 
“[t]he owner, the charterer, the company operating the ship . . . or any 
other person shall not prevent or restrict the master of the ship from 
taking or executing any decision which, in the master’s professional 
judgment, is necessary for safety of life at sea.”72 Overall, the new and 
amended provisions make it clear that states are to resolve any 
international conflicts arising out of a SAR mission and that these are not 
the responsibility of master and crew.73 Governments are responsible for 
coordinating their actions and cooperating so that recued persons are 
disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety.74 
Economic pressure on the captain is to be neutralized, because the 
master’s sole duty in such circumstances is to render assistance to 
persons in danger at sea.75 The enactment of Resolution A.920(22) and 
the 2006 changes to the IMO constitute a significant milestone in 
applying basic humanitarian standards at sea. 
Under point 3.1 of the IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea, flag states and coastal states are required to “have 
effective arrangements in place for timely assistance to shipmasters in 
relieving them of persons recovered by ships at sea.”76 The idea is that 
the master of a ship should not have to worry about his or her vessel’s 
capacity to feed and shelter a large number of rescued people for a longer 
period of time. Ship owners should not have to be concerned that their 
vessel will be out of business for an extended period, and hence running 
a loss, if the captain rescues persons in distress. There remain some 
differences in interpretation, but these ambiguities can be resolved if 
coastal states are willing to accept a greater balance between their 
security interests and the need to assist ships’ masters that have fulfilled 
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their humanitarian obligation to assist and rescue persons in distress at 
sea. This should lead to a decrease in the pressure felt by the master of 
the ship. Essentially, the IMO’s aim is to make it as easy as possible for 
the master to decide in favor of a rescue operation and to comply with his 
or her obligation under the international law of the sea.77 The larger issue 
of refugees at sea, however, remains unresolved.  
The IMO framework is by far the best implementation of the duty to 
assist and has been improved significantly since the Tampa affair. The 
IMO’s reaction to Tampa shows that a coordinated effort involving 
several UN agencies can be effective.  It highlighted the need for a more 
proactive, multi-dimensional approach underpinned by a human rights 
framework and the important role that sanctions can play in preventing 
regulatory breaches.  
V. EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Although the aforementioned international legal documents provide 
refugees some legal protections, the IMO Guidelines do not provide a 
private right of action for individual refugees against states—that is, the 
rescuing ship’s flag state and the coastal state to which the rescued 
refugee is brought—should they fail to provide the refugee with the 
protection envisaged by the IMO. This raises the question, at least with 
regard to European states, of whether the ECHR78 provides legal 
recourse for refugees.79  After all, the ECHR is binding upon the states 
that have ratified it, it can be claimed in court, and if necessary, the 
persons concerned can bring their case to the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg.80 
A. Asylum and the ECHR 
Over the years, there have been a large number of asylum cases 
before the European Court of Human Rights. Of particular interest to 
asylum seekers is the fact that Article 6 (1) of the ECHR is often 
understood as not applying to asylum proceedings.81 Article 1 (1) of 
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Protocol 7 to the ECHR, which has not been ratified by all state parties to 
the ECHR, is not applicable in this regard because it only refers to 
persons who are “lawful[] resident[s] in the territory of a State,”82  thus 
excluding refugees from non-ECHR states. With regard to refugees from 
state parties to the ECHR, Article 1 (1) of Protocol 7 is an obligation of 
the state where the foreign citizen already resides and is therefore of 
limited value in asylum cases.  
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, in the style of Justice Blackmun’s 
dissenting opinion on the United State Supreme Court’s Sale Case,83 
phrases this issue as follows:  
[r]efugees attempting to escape Africa do not claim a right of 
admission to Europe. They demand only that Europe, the cradle 
of human rights idealism and the birthplace of the rule of law, 
cease closing its doors to people in despair who have fled from 
arbitrariness and brutality. That is a very modest plea, vindicated 
by the European Convention on Human Rights. We should not 
close our ears to it.84 
While governments often have no interest in taking in more refugees, 
states do have some legal responsibility under the ECHR for what 
happens to refugees once they have been required to leave their 
jurisdiction.85 The most famous case in this regard is still that of Soering 
v. United Kingdom,86 which concerns the extradition of a murder 
suspect.87 However, a residual or indirect responsibility also rests with 
states regarding refugees who have come under their jurisdiction. For 
example, Article 3 of the ECHR protects a refugee against being sent to a 
third country which has the known intention of sending the refugee back 
to his home country where he might face persecution.88 While the ECHR 
does not require states to refrain from sending refugees back to countries 
in which lesser human rights standards apply,89 a number of minimum 
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standards have been identified by the ECHR90: states are not permitted to 
send refugees back to states in which the fundamental rights, which are 
codified in Articles 2,91 3,92 5,93 694 and 9,95 of the ECHR are not met. In 
such cases, the states have to obey the principle of non-refoulement.  
The Hirsi Jamaa judgment is the European Court of Human Rights’ 
long overdue reaction to Italy’s practice of refoulement against refugees 
arriving in boats. 96  There, the Court held that Italy had violated human 
rights principles by spurning African migrants and asylum-seekers on the 
high seas and returning them to their native country where they faced 
threat of systematic human rights abuses. 97 This decision is significant 
because refugees from both Eritrea and Somalia, in enormous numbers, 
are still trying to reach Europe to escape from degrading treatment and 
the fear of persecution in their native countries. The office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 
approximately 1,500 people drowned or went missing crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea in 2011.98 The judgment of the Grand Chamber in 
M.S.S.99 represents a fundamental decision in this area of the law. In 
M.S.S., the judges saw a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR in the 
inhumane and degrading conditions of life and detention of refugees in 
Greece and a breach of Article 13 of the ECHR by the lack of an 
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effective remedy against the asylum procedures.100 The Court also 
allowed for an exception to the application of the Dublin II Regulation.101 
Accordingly, Hirsi Jamaa and M.S.S. represent landmark decisions in the 
fight against asylum proceedings that violate international human rights 
standards.102   
Concerning the territorial scope of states under the Convention, the 
Grand Chamber reiterates that jurisdiction is generally governed by the 
principle of territoriality and only in exceptional cases may it be applied 
extraterritorially.103 This is possible in cases of diplomatic or consular 
agents abroad or on board of vessels or aircraft flying the flag of the 
state.104 Because of these circumstances and the fact that the military 
vessels receiving and transporting refugees to Tripoli were flying the 
Italian flag, and thus, were under effective control of Italy, Italy was 
exercising jurisdiction under Article 1 of the ECHR also on the high 
sea.105 By comparison in Medvedyev, the Strasbourg judges pointed out 
that a vessel, even if flying the flag of a third state, but under French 
military control, was de facto under French effective control and thus 
jurisdiction existed.106 
B. Positive and Institutional Obligations 
Human Rights obligations under the ECHR are often primarily 
understood from a negative perspective; that is, prohibiting a state from 
engaging in certain activities which violate human rights. But positive 
obligations, such as the duty of the state to prevent human rights 
violations, do not have to be spelled out explicitly in the text of 
Convention norms in order to exist.107 Article 1 of the ECHR obligates 
states to “ensure” that human rights are protected, regardless of whether 
this requires states to refrain from an action or to take some kind of 
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positive action. Beyond this, states have “[a] duty to put in place a legal 
framework which provides effective protection for Convention rights.”108  
In the cases outlined at the end of Section V.(A), where returning the 
refugees to their place of origin would likely subject them to human 
rights violations, the state has a negative obligation to refrain from 
sending those refugees back. This can be understood as a specific 
application of the principle of non-refoulement as viewed through the 
lens of the ECHR. Still, in order to identify these cases, there has to be 
some kind of process, however it need not be solely intentional and  may 
be designed on the domestic level. This requires that the state enter into a 
legal relationship with the refugee, which at a minimum acknowledges 
the refugee’s legal personality and basic fundamental rights. As a 
consequence, states are not permitted to pretend that the presence of a 
refugee within their jurisdiction does not trigger some responsibilities on 
their part, as would be the case if islands off the coast of the mainland or 
the transit area of an international airport were permitted to be 
considered outside the jurisdiction of that state.  
Which institutional consequences have to be drawn from this general 
obligation depends on how the term “secure,”109 as used in Article 1 of 
the ECHR, is understood. While one might be forgiven for assuming that 
it is sufficient that ECHR-compliant solutions are found on a case-by-
case basis, this is only the case as far as individual complaints are 
concerned. “Secur[ing]”110 human rights means that there are both 
negative and positive obligations. But the obligation under Article 1 of 
the ECHR also includes an objective element in that the states which 
have ratified the ECHR have to create a culture of respect for human 
rights. 
Yet, the obligations under the ECHR also have an international, i.e. 
interstate, dimension because it is, after all, an international treaty, a fact 
that is easy to overlook in light of its function of providing victims of 
human rights violations with a way to bring suit against the violating 
state in international court. The fact that interstate complaints, such as 
earlier this year by Ukraine v. Russia,111 are possible under Article 33 of 
the ECHR is a reminder of the legal nature of the ECHR. Article 1 of the 
ECHR not only requires that states “secure” human rights but the norm 
requires that states “secure [these rights] to everyone.”112 Parties to the 
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ECHR owe this obligation to everyone, not just individually but 
collectively to the totality of natural and legal persons within their 
jurisdiction.113 This obligation is not only owed to applicants in 
proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, it is also an 
obligation the parties have towards the other states that have ratified the 
ECHR. The Brighton Declaration,114 in which states vowed to implement 
the ECHR as interpreted by the Court, and which is in line with the 
Court’s judgments, (which are only binding inter partes115) even if the 
judgment in question was directed against another state,116 makes sense 
not only as a tool to improve the protection of human rights across 
Europe but also in its nature as an international agreement between the 
states which ratified the Convention. It follows from the word “secure” 
in Article 1 of the ECHR that the states having ratified the ECHR have 
the obligation to undertake every measure necessary to make sure that 
the rights which have been codified in the ECHR are given the fullest 
effect possible.117 While it can sometimes suffice for a state to not 
interfere with these rights, this is not always the case. Structural or 
institutional measures are necessary in situations equivalent to that of the 
Tampa, where the refugees on board found themselves falling through 
gaps in the laws with no place to go. Generally, this means that the state 
in question will have to engage its legislative organs in order to provide a 
solution that guarantees compliance with the Convention. This is because 
Article 1 of the ECHR requires that nobody be considered outside the 
law.118  
C. Jurisdiction 
Humanitarian considerations have long played a role in the rules 
governing the conduct at sea. Like universal jurisdiction, a universal duty 
to rescue is a practical response to protecting the right to life. Although 
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the duty to rescue does not require masters to risk the lives of their crew, 
mere financial considerations do not justify the denial of the duty to 
rescue. To that degree, the Law of the Sea protects the human rights of 
those at sea. This duty to rescue can be traced back to the historical roots 
of maritime ethics, which are based on a fundamental respect for human 
life and human dignity. According to the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS), “[c]onsiderations of humanity must apply in the 
law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law.”119 
Similarly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has reflected on the 
relevance of elementary considerations of humanity as a general 
principle of international law in Corfu Channel case, and this issue has 
been taken up by ITLOS in several other relevant cases.120 While the 
ECHR does not make direct reference to its applicability at sea, it can be, 
and has been, used with regard to maritime matters.121 
Article 311(2) of UNCLOS states that “[t]his Convention shall not 
alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from other 
agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the 
enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of 
their obligations under this Convention.”122 This does not mean that the 
ECHR has to be strictly interpreted in accordance with UNCLOS. 
Rather, it means that UNCLOS does not take away human rights granted 
under the ECHR. This also provides ECHR the discretion to take the law 
of the sea into account.  
With regard to the question of jurisdiction, Article 1 of the ECHR 
connects the responsibility for human rights to jurisdiction, and in order 
for the ECHR to be applicable in the first place the applicant must be in 
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the jurisdiction of a state that has ratified the ECHR.123 Here a 
differentiation must be recognized between the different maritime zones 
and the flag flown by the rescuing ship. 
1. Maritime Zones 
In the context of the international law of the sea, both under the rules 
codified in UNCLOS and under customary international law, states enjoy 
different types of jurisdiction in different parts of the sea.124 The 
definitions employed in UNCLOS can provide some guidance as to 
whether a state actually has jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 
of the ECHR but do not answer this question: particularly, can 
neighboring coastal states agree on the designation of specific response 
areas for maritime disasters? These response areas do not necessarily 
correspond to maritime zones as outlined in the UNCLOS but take into 
account practical considerations such as, for example, how fast coast 
guard or other rescue vessels can reach a particular location. The 
European Union’s FRONTEX mission is a logical continuation of this 
practice, bringing together vessels from a number of European Union 
member states. This cooperation also serves to lessen individual state 
burdens, which are primarily carried by the European Union’s southern 
states, which are often overwhelmed by an ever-growing number of 
refugees.  
2. European Convention on Human Rights 
The term “jurisdiction” in Article 1 of the ECHR is to be interpreted 
within the general framework of the ECHR. Hence, the term 
“jurisdiction” within the meaning of the ECHR can have a different 
meaning than the same term under UNCLOS. Under the ECHR, the issue 
of jurisdiction is of utmost importance, as states are responsible for 
safeguarding human rights for those who are under their jurisdiction, 
regardless of their nationality or how they came to be under the 
jurisdiction of the state in question. As far as refugees who attempt to 
reach Europe by sea are concerned, several alternatives are possible. 
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a. European flag states 
A person who has come on board a vessel flying the flag of a state 
that has ratified the ECHR is within the jurisdiction of that state for the 
purpose of Article 1 of the ECHR. But the flag state’s jurisdiction over 
the ships which fly its flag also requires that state to ensure that the 
masters of such ships actually fulfill their obligation to provide assistance 
to those in need. It can be argued that a state can be held to account, for 
example, for a violation of the right to life of a refugee in distress at sea 
who could be rescued by a ship which flies the flag of a state which has 
ratified the ECHR if the master of the ship is capable of saving that 
person’s life without undue risk to the vessel or crew, is aware of the 
need to do so, and fails to rescue that person for lack of legal 
repercussions under the national laws of the flag state. The right to life, a 
human right of the most fundamental importance, requires states to 
ensure through legislative, administrative, and adjudicative measures that 
all efforts are undertaken to save human lives.  
The flag state’s jurisdiction extends to all ships which fly its flag. 
The pre-existence of an obligation which is incumbent on the master of 
the ship and on the flag state under the law of the sea means that, in the 
moment this obligation arises, the individual who would be a beneficiary 
of this obligation (which, as an obligation under general public 
international law, is an obligation between the flag state of the assisting 
ship and the flag state of the vessel which is in need of assistance) falls 
within the jurisdiction of the flag state for the purposes of this rescue. 
The person in distress also remains under the jurisdiction of the flag state 
of the vessel he is on, for the purposes for which that flag state has 
jurisdiction, and potentially, depending on the location, under the 
jurisdiction of a coastal state, in line with that coastal state’s rights and 
obligations under the law of the sea. For the purposes of the rescue, the 
jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the ECHR,  of the flag 
state of a vessel which could provide assistance is triggered. This is not 
to say that the flag state has any other legal powers in this regard. Rather, 
for the specific relationship between the ship which could provide 
assistance and the person in distress, the flag state might be held 
accountable for failing to ensure that help which could be provided 
without risk to the ship which flies its flag is actually provided.  
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b. Other flag states  
On board a ship flying a foreign flag–or no flag at all–the  question 
whether the refugee is also under the jurisdiction of another state 
depends on the location of the ship on which the refugee is located. 125 
i. Territorial Seas of European States 
As all coastal states in the south of Europe, including Turkey and the 
island nations of Cyprus and Malta, are parties to the ECHR, the question 
has to be asked whether a refugee, who is on a ship which is flying a 
foreign flag or no flag, comes under the jurisdiction of such a state 
merely by entering that state’s territorial sea. From the perspective of the 
law of the sea, this is not necessarily the case. While the territorial sea is 
part of the state’s territory, foreign vessels enjoy a right of innocent 
passage126 and usually states refrain from exercising their jurisdiction 
with regard to purely internal matters on board.127 The right to innocent 
passage is based on the basic idea of the freedom of navigation, which is 
only fully realized on the high seas.128 The flag state’s right to innocent 
passage of the ships flying its flag impacts the coastal state’s rights, but 
foreign ships’ right to innocent passage does not free the coastal state 
from its obligations under the ECHR. In implementing their international 
legal obligations, states have to ensure that the rights which have been 
codified in the ECHR are given full effect. States therefore cannot ‘hide’ 
behind their obligations under the Law of the Sea Convention in order to 
justify an infringement of rights included in the ECHR. All limitations of 
rights under the ECHR have to be in accordance with the rules set on 
limitations under that Convention. 
There is not yet an established hierarchy between the different legal 
norms in international law, but it is now recognized that international 
                                                     
 125. UNCLOS, supra note 35, at art. 92(2); see also Allyson Bennett, That Sinking 
Feeling: Stateless Ships, Universal Jurisdiction, and the Drug Trafficking Vessel 
Interdiction Act, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 433, 439-40 n.33 (2012). 
 126. UNCLOS, supra note 38, at art. 17. 
 127. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 24 – Apr. 27, 1958, 
Annex Text of Articles 1 to 25 and 66 Adopted by the International Law Committee at its 
Eighth Session, art. 20, A/3159, available at http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences 
/lawofthesea-1958/docs/english/vol_III/19_ANNEXES_1st_Cttee_vol_III_e.pdf. 
 128. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 81 
(Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1995); see also Florian H. Th. Wegelein, Innocent Passage 
(Feb. 1999), http://www.seerecht.org/wegelein/iptext.htm. 
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human rights laws also have a role to play in the law of the sea.129 In a 
sense, human rights issues are increasingly becoming part of the 
constitutional dimension130 of international law, such that states are no 
longer able to justify human rights violations by claiming that the 
violating measures were necessary to honor other obligations under 
international law. In the case of jus cogens norms, this can never be the 
case. If non-refoulement is indeed jus cogens, states are obliged to 
prevent refoulement from their territorial sea, even if the refugee in 
question has never set foot on the coastal state’s land.  
ii. Territorial Sea of non-ECHR states 
The question as to whether the European coastal state has 
jurisdiction over a refugee is easily answered if that refugee is on board a 
foreign-flagged ship that is in the territorial sea of another state. Then, 
the refugee is under the jurisdiction of either the coastal state (from the 
perspective of the ECHR) or the flag state (from the perspective of both 
the ECHR and the law of the sea). For example, a refugee from Sudan, 
who is on a Tunisian-flagged vessel, within Libya’s territorial sea, is not 
under Italy’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article 1 of the ECHR.  
iii. Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone of an ECHR 
State 
The question becomes significantly more complicated if, for 
example, the Tunisian-flagged vessel enters Italy’s Exclusive Economic 
Zone,131 or Italy’s Contiguous Zone,132 assuming that both have been 
claimed.133 In both zones (the Contiguous Zone being a part of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone), the coastal state’s powers are limited.134 
                                                     
 129. Tullio Treves, Human Rights and the Law of the Sea, 28 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 1, 6 
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Legal System?, 5 GERMAN L. J. 1, 47, 56 (2004). 
 131. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 38, at Part V. 
 132. Id. at art. 33. 
 133. See ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CLAIMS: AN ANALYSIS AND 
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 11 (1986). 
 134. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 35, at art. 56; William R. Ederson, A Brief 
Introduction to the Principal Provisions of the International Legal Regime Governing 
Fisheries in the EEZ, in A SEA CHANGE: THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND 
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Hence, in these areas the state has some form of control. It is said that in 
order to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the ECHR, 
the states must have complete control over the area in question,135 and 
this completeness ought to be understood in relation to competing claims 
of control over a specific area and with regard to the non-transient nature 
of this control. In the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Contiguous 
Zone, the coastal state’s control is not as complete as it is on land or in 
the territorial sea, but it usually is also not challenged by another coastal 
state. The coastal state’s control over an Exclusive Economic Zone or 
Contiguous Zone is limited with regard to certain subject matters. 
However, once a person falls within any of the categories in which the 
coastal state claims authority pursuant to UNCLOS,136 that person is 
under the jurisdiction of the coastal state. For example, the Greenpeace 
protesters that were arrested by Russian authorities in Russia’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone in 2013137 were under Russia’s jurisdiction within the 
meaning of Article 1 of the ECHR, both at the moment they were 
apprehended by Russian agents and  from moment that they entered the 
exclusion zone around the oil rig, against which they were protesting. In 
this context, it is the exclusion zone which had actually been claimed and 
enforced by Russia, which is relevant, even though the size of that 
exclusion zone was incompatible with the UNCLOS. Likewise, if a 
coastal state enforces immigration legislation in the Contiguous or the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, regardless of the compatibility with 
UNCLOS or customary international law of the sea, a refugee would fall 
under its jurisdiction under Article 1 of the ECHR.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
If a refugee comes under the jurisdiction of a coastal state to any 
degree, that state has the obligation to take all measures which are 
necessary to ensure that the human rights of that person are fully 
protected. No state may deprive a person under its jurisdiction of the 
protections afforded by the law, including those provided by the ECHR. 
If necessary, the obligation to secure the rights codified in the 
                                                                                                                       
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS FOR LIVING MARINE RESOURCES 17, 24 (Syma A. Ebbin et al. 
eds., 2005). 
 135. GRABENWARTER, supra note 113, at 8. 
 136. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 35, at art. 2. 
 137. Note that this eventually led to the decision of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea in the The Arctic Sunrise Case (No. 22) (Neth. v. Russ.), Order of Nov. 
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Convention138 can include an obligation on the part of coastal states to 
enact domestic legislation to ensure that no foreigner within its territory 
falls outside its legal jurisdiction. A repetition of the Tampa incident in a 
state party to the European Convention on Human Rights would 
therefore result in a violation of the Convention. 
 
 
                                                     
 138. In particular, those rights which the European Court of Human Rights has 
identified as being so important that a state which plans to expel a foreigner can have a 
residual responsibility to protect the foreigner against violations thereof. 
